The history of US involvement overseas is littered with incidents having similar roots to the 2012 attack on our Consulate and Annex in Benghazi. Some stem from the principle that we are a nation that places political authority over that of the military. It is a founding principle that has kept us free from tyranny and made us great. It is also the reason that from time to time, political appointees or career officials make choices that overrule tactical reality and military prudence, and ultimately result in the death of the very people that serve to defend those principles. Our military and members of other government agencies voluntarily place themselves under the authority of these same officials, who are often ill-equipped to make the type of tactical decisions that can mean the difference between life and death. These officials sometimes refuse for various reasons to take counsel from those with experience in these environments and dealing with people who are ultimately out to kill Americans. This is the way it is and should be in a free nation like ours. However, as a nation that realizes the preciousness of the blood of its treasure, from time to time those leaders and our fellow citizens need to pause and take a close look at the impact of those decisions or the refusal to make one. We then need to bring the motives behind those decisions to light, so when future leaders are faced with similar decisions or similar motivations, we have the corporate memory and lessons from the past to serve as a caution in the decision making process. To hold those leaders accountable goes without saying, for authority without accountability leads to tyranny.
During my career I experienced such decisions on a couple occasions beginning in Beirut in 1982 and in Yemen in 1998/99. I was not in Benghazi, but was reading the initial reports of action as the attacks were unfolding and immediately knew it was a planned attack, as did the vast majority of persons with similar military experience. Our nation remains split into two camps regarding Benghazi; there are those who want to know “How could Benghazi have happened and what can we do to prevent another” and others who believe Benghazi was an unavoidable and unfortunate turn of events from which we should move on. My perspective is that of those who pay the bills for the checks written by our political leaders and who ultimately pay the price when their decisions fall short. To us moving forward from Benghazi without our leaders and fellow citizens having realized that something dishonorable occurred brings distrust to how we view such leaders and leaves us disappointed in those all too happy to forget the sacrifices of our brothers and sisters. Perhaps a look back at a couple of events where aspects of the decision making process was similar to those of Benghazi can help people understand why Benghazi should be important to us all, and why the reasons behind decisions or lack of decisions surrounding the death of four Americans must be brought to light.
Beirut Lebanon 1982: I was one of the Marines of the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit that deployed into Beirut three times in 1982, first to evacuate civilians, then to evacuate the PLO and serve as Peacekeepers between the PLO and the Israelis. Lastly, following massacres at two refugee camps, we were the Marines that spearheaded the Multi-National Force (MNF) peacekeeping mission, which ultimately ended following the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut in October 1983.
As we began the MNF, I was the Lieutenant of the Reconnaissance Platoon. At one point we were assigned to provide security along the beach where all the supplies arrived by ship and which flanked the western side of the Marine positions. We set up on the beach as the rest of the Marines began moving into the ill-fated barracks. Our position on the beach was located below the main road along the coast. The Seabees built a sand ramp from the beach up to the road level by which they could get supplies and vehicles from the beach to the road some 20 or so meters above the beach. The location and terrain placed our platoon in a precarious position tactically, as we had no cover from direct fire. To remedy this we had the Seabees push up large berms of sand, equal to the height of the road to provide cover. On those we built several sandbagged positions where we could establish fire positions in the event we needed to repel an attack. At the place where the ramp met the beach road, we took large plywood containers, several feet in height and width that were left over from supplies brought ashore. We placed two flanking the top of the ramp where it met the beach road, one on each side. We placed layers of sandbags outside the wood to provide protection from small arms fire and put machine gun positions in each to provide enfilading fire along the road above the US positions on the beach. The containers had lids, which we raised a little above the rest of the box with 2 X 4s to form roofs, which we also layered with sandbags. This was to provide overhead cover (protection from overhead fire or grenades), routine stuff for any infantryman and necessary to protect the Marines manning that position.
A few days after constructing the machine gun positions, I was summoned by one of my platoon to the top of the ramp, where a pacing American wearing a suit waited. He identified himself as the US Ambassador and then asked me if those sandbag positions were reinforced with wood. I told him they indeed were and that the wood enabled us to put multiple layers of sandbags on to provide protection from direct and indirect small arms fire in these very exposed positions, which were key to the defense of the entire beach area. He then told me that the wood made it seem like we were planning to be in Beirut a long time and that was not the image the US wanted to convey. He then requested I take the wood down, which meant removing the overhead protection. Not then understanding the role of an Ambassador with regards to the military chain of command, I politely refused, even after he reminded me he was the Ambassador. Convinced I would be putting the Marines of that position in undue danger by removing the roofs and wood reinforcement, I informed the Ambassador that I would remove the wood only if ordered to do so by a Marine of higher rank in my chain of command. Not surprisingly, about 20 minutes after the Ambassador’s car sped off, I got the radio call to take down the wood immediately.
We were never attacked at the beach and thus never had to find out if the Ambassador’s decision would have cost the lives of Marines. We left Lebanon, and the beach position was eventually given up by our replacements that were moved into the barracks. We do know that even as the security situation in Beirut deteriorated, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Marines at the ill-fated barracks were not changed to keep up with the increasing dangers. The Marines on guard at the gate of the barracks were still not authorized to have a round in the chamber of their rifles, slowing down any response to a deadly emergency. Other ROE heavily favored the more benign security situation we encountered in 1982 and requests for modifications to the ROE for the Marine barracks were met with what I would term political indifference by the higher headquarters. The bombing of the barracks resulted in the death of 241 Marines, soldiers and sailors.
In my opinion Beirut decisions, intentionally or not and over the course of time, resulted in the subjugation of the safety of Americans for the sake of political messaging. Perhaps it was the case where no single decision caused the deaths, but each pushed the pendulum that swings between military prudence and political interests farther away from the side of military prudence and in Beirut, it resulted in tragedy.
Sana and Aden Yemen 1998/99: Forward a few years from Beirut and I found myself a Special Forces (SF) soldier in Yemen in 1998/1999. I was in charge of security and served as the Intelligence Sergeant for the first group of US service members (a demining contingent of Special Forces and US Navy EOD personnel) to enter Yemen, at least since the 1994 revolution overthrowing the communist government of South Yemen. I went to Yemen a few months ahead of the others to get the lay of the land and assess the security conditions for the others to follow. I was initially located in the capital of Sana as the details of the demining mission, undertaken in support of the US Embassy outreach to the Government of Yemen (GOY), were finalized. I travelled occasionally by car to and from the northern capital of Sana to Aden on the southern coast, where the demining mission was to later take place. By then I was a member of 5th Special Forces Group and had deployed to the Mid-East a couple times, but knew little other than pre-deployment reading about Yemen.
Soon local newspapers began reporting Americans were going to come to Yemen to begin demining, and a group called The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) began publishing threats against the demining contingent and US interests. The official US position championed by Ambassador Barbara Bodine was that the IAA “was a group of two or three people with a fax machine who posed no threat.” The rest of the “experts” in the Embassy repeated the Ambassador’s opinion, even after there was an explosion of a car bomb near the German Embassy in Sana. As the time for the demining contingent to arrive neared, we discussed security precautions for them. Our security would rely primarily on whatever we could provide ourselves, as we had no other US forces to provide support or come to our rescue in event of an attack. Special Forces teams are accustomed to providing for their own security and operating independently, so we made plans to secure ourselves with our own small arms. To our amazement and later chagrin, Ambassador Bodine refused to let us have our rifles in Aden, saying they would stay in a locked box in Sana (8 to 10 hours away by vehicle). We argued vehemently for the weapons, citing that we routinely carried them in many countries and would not use them unless under attack. Bodine persisted in her stance that we were neither country nor culture experts on Yemen and that we had no need for the weapons. The issue became contentious with the SF portion of the mission on the verge of abandoning the mission if required to conduct it without the trust to at least have our rifles on the same compound where we were living. We even offered to keep them locked in a metal box unless we were under attack, but the Ambassador persisted, not trusting that we had the judgment to decide when the weapons were needed. Instead, our security was to be entrusted to Yemeni driver/guards from their intelligence service. We joked that in the event of an attack we’d take their AKs and defend ourselves, referring to our so-called guards as “150 pound gun racks.”
A few weeks later, a group later dubbed “The Aden Six” was captured in Aden in a car carrying mines, rockets, and AK-47s. They also were in possession of a sketch of the hotel where our demining contingent was based. We then moved to a more secure compound that was located on the outskirts of Aden. We again lobbied to have our rifles on our compound in a locked box, to be opened only in event of an attack. Again Ambassador Bodine refused, even travelling to our location in Aden where in a meeting in front of the entire contingent, she told us she would rather run the risk of us getting hurt than leaving us with rifles, even if there was only a slight possibility that even one civilian could get hurt by us. To say we were angry and felt untrusted is a huge understatement, but we were soldiers and sailors there to do a job, so we continued to do the best we could and put in place as many measures as we could to protect ourselves. We attributed what we viewed as a cavalier attitude regarding our safety to a potential visit to Yemen by then First Lady Hillary Clinton. It was a very high priority to the Ambassador, but Clinton would not be advised to come to Yemen if the security situation was deemed unsafe. A young protege of Clinton’s even flew out to advance a potential FLOTUS trip, and our SF team provided her security in Aden armed with our pistols only. After I persisted in lobbying to have our rifles, other officials working inside the Embassy offered me “friendly” advice not to get between the Ambassador and her plans for a Clinton visit.
Some weeks later, the IAA took hostages from the British Consulate in Aden in hopes of exchanging them for The Aden Six. This kidnapping ended in a standoff and shootout between government forces and the IAA, with several hostages being killed along with some of the kidnappers. It was a botched rescue operation and a foolhardy stand by the IAA, but nonetheless, it was a violent action ending with the death of hostages. Still, according to the Ambassador and the security organs within the Embassy, the IAA actions were deemed to be futile and amateurish, and the security conditions in Yemen country were still officially considered benign. In 1999, after months of reviewing reports, spending months on the ground in Aden and Sana, and having years of experience in counter-terrorism, I became increasingly convinced that US lives were at risk in Yemen, even as the agreement to allow US Naval vessels to dock in Aden was reached. (Note; an AQ attack on the USS Sullivan was attempted January 3, 2000 and the Attack on the USS Cole was in October 2000.)
My contention with the Embassy was that the IAA did indeed pose a potentially significant threat to US interest in Yemen. I argued that the IAA, though fairly inept operationally, had shown that 1) they had access to weapons and explosives, 2) that they had proven they were willing to take violent action, and 3) that they wished to target US interests. Further, we knew that though the IAA was not an operational arm, they were in contact with Al-Qa’ida (AQ). I surmised should the IAA ever either accept operational direction and training from AQ, or serve as a host to an AQ cell, that they would be capable of conducting or facilitating significant attacks against US interests in Yemen.
I agonized about the security situation for months and my inability to get my opinion voiced outside Yemen; I was, after all, sent as an experienced professional to provide the security oversight to protect our group; as I saw it, that included any American in Yemen. I finally decided to send my military opinion to my commanders at 5th Group and Special Operations Command Central Command (SOCCENT) via a Special Forces area assessment report without it being an “intelligence” report and at least get something in writing voicing concern, not wanting to look back on a terror attack thinking, “If only I’d…” I sent the report via military only channels and only afterwards, sent the Embassy a “courtesy copy.” I then quickly learned that no one in the USG could send a report out of a country without first allowing it to be edited by or include the comments of the Ambassador. The demining mission ended later in 1999, and I departed convinced all the indicators that Yemen was becoming dangerous were there and dismayed that nobody in the Embassy wanted to see that potential, and even worse, the Ambassador wanted to make sure nobody expressed a differing opinion.
I then prepared for another mission in the Middle East, which began 1 January 2000. On 3 January terrorist unsuccessfully attempted to destroy the USS Sullivan in the Port of Aden and in October of that year conducted the attack on the USS Cole. As the Cole Commission began hearing testimony, I was brought to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Tampa to give a written statement, which would be given to the Commission. Afterwards, my quote of the comments of Ambassador Bodine about preferring to risk us getting hurt vice allowing us to have rifles was deleted, as well other information used in my estimate of the security situation in Yemen. It was explained to me that USSOCOM did not want to get involved in a war with the State Department over Yemen because it might negatively impact US Special Operations Forces gaining permission from The Department of State to enter countries.
I was disappointed to say the least, for I was asked to give the deposition because I correctly predicted that Yemen was becoming dangerous for Americans and correctly predicted that the enemy there was capable of conducting a significant attack against US interest. I thought the goal was to get out information on how to assess potential threats and to get to the real reason as to why warnings of people with experience in counter-terrorism were not heeded. I thought the Cole Commission was to serve as a civilian form of a “hot wash.” Hot washes are used in special operations to go over the details of a rehearsal or an operation immediately after to bring out all the good and bad that happened. It is a frank discussion where feelings are secondary to the goal of making operations better in order to improve the chances for success and to save lives. However, in the end it appeared to me that political correctness between the military and State Department regarding the situation leading to the USS Cole prevailed over identifying the roots of the problem.
Benghazi 9/11/2012: Details of the attacks resulting in the deaths of Americans at Benghazi are under scrutiny, as well as the actions and decisions of those charged with the safety of those assigned there. I do not wish to debate the details here. One thing is certain; as the attack went on, several facts pointed to a determined pre-planned attack: 1) when the Annex personnel were returning to the Annex after rescuing Embassy personnel from the Consulate, they were placed under sustained fire from a long linear ambush along their route. A “spontaneous group” would not set up an ambush like that. 2) Mortar fire killed the two Annex personnel. Mortars are not weapons carried to a spontaneous protest. 3) The mortar fire was aimed, accurate and deadly, requiring a degree of training and experience. These were simple truths available to anyone that cared to look for them in the time during and immediately following the attacks.
Causes: Political party affiliation is not a major factor in the cause of these incidents, Beirut happened during the Reagan administration. I like to believe that earnest people, taking their role in US policy very seriously, sometimes make calls not understanding the price at stake or the full implications of the situation on the ground. Perhaps the decision maker does not hold the lives of servicemen in high esteem; maybe blind ambition sometimes has an undue influence. I do however, believe that political motivations come into play after an incident such as Benghazi happens.
There is a pendulum as to where decisions such as the ones mentioned fall, the position of which depends on the mood of the country, the tone and direction of the President and the character of the person in place to make the prescient decisions. Pendulums like this characterize America’s policy and are good to prevent any one brand of thought from taking us too far down a particular train of thought; pendulums help us self correct. Problem is that it often takes an incident like any of these I mention to provide enough momentum to swing the pendulum back towards military prudence. More significantly, these types of incidents almost always exact a price in American lives.
Americans such as the Marines in Beirut, the sailors on the USS Cole, and the men in Benghazi will always volunteer to go anywhere they are needed in the service of their country, even to the very gates of Hell. They can achieve almost any mission, given the proper support to provide for their security. Those that make the security decisions should be held accountable. If requests for security help or improvements made by professionals on the ground are to be denied, then perhaps the mission is not worth the risk.
Politicians and career officials should not have it both ways, demanding the presence of American personnel, but not approving their requests for additional support their professional experience deems appropriate. That is tantamount to telling the people performing the mission that their judgment is not trusted. Military leaders in position to deal with the political decision-makers must also be willing to “go to the mat” when issues of preserving lives arise. Sometimes overruling military requests are a good thing; we tend to err on the side of more is better and are proactive regarding security and accomplishing our military mission. Sometimes a broader perspective is needed to make a final decision. Such decisions should be taken only after carefully weighing the benefit to our nation against the potential cost in lives.
Those that whitewashed inquiries and those who remained silent either as events in Benghazi unfolded or in its aftermath failed in the most solemn charge they have: to make sure the lives of those who serve under them are not sacrificed without first making every effort to support them. In such conflicts of opinion, any senior leader of the military (uniformed or not) who is not part of the solution is part of the problem. Benghazi was not the first nor last incident of its kind, but we must be able to be honest about the “what” and “why” of an incident. Not to do so not only devalues the lives sacrificed, it cheapens the nobility of our purpose that sent us to those same shores.
This is not to say that risking lives for political goals is never a risk worth taking; instead, it is a plea that our leaders make sure that they truly value and consider the lives they are risking. Given the world today and the threat facing Americans around the globe, we must continue to go down the road of putting people in situations like Beirut, Yemen and Benghazi again and again. Let us at least proceed with eyes wide open, exercising the wisdom we have gained from the mishaps and occasional reckless driving we have experienced along the way.
